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ABSTRACT 
 
Dynamic Econometric Program Evaluation∗ 
 
H. Theil has made important contributions to the analysis of simultaneous-equations models. 
This paper gives an exposition of some closely related recent developments in micro-
econometrics, with a focus on efforts to develop robust methods for dynamic policy 
evaluation. We set the stage with a brief discussion of the static treatment-effect approach to 
program evaluation and non-parametric structural models. We then critically analyze the 
dynamic treatment-effects approach adopted from statistics. Finally, we review the event-
history approach. We clarify some of the fundamental problems that arise in the analysis of 
such models by rephrasing a canonical version as a simultaneous-equations model. 
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1 Introduction
Economists have traditionally addressed the problem of causal inference by specifying
and estimating structural models. This approach was pioneered in the 1920s and 1930s,
then rigorously pursued in inuential work by the Cowles Commission, and later en-
riched with more sophisticated dynamics.
1
Theil has made important contributions to
this literature, notably the two-stage least-squares estimator (Theil, 1953), and the three-
stage least squares estimator (Zellner and Theil, 1962). Theil's (1971) classic text book
has taught many econometricians, among other things, the principles underlying these
methods. This paper gives an exposition of some closely related recent developments in
micro-econometrics, with a focus on eorts to develop robust methods for dynamic policy
evaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage with a brief discussion
of the static treatment-eect approach to program evaluation and recent work on non-
parametric structural models. We stress the close connection between a stability concept
used in statistics and the concept of autonomy used in econometric structural-equations
modelling. We briey consider what can be learned from inference on non-parametric
structural models. We conclude that reduced-form analysis has gained importance relative
to structural analysis with the move away from parametric, linear models.
In Section 3, we critically analyze the dynamic treatment-eects approach to policy
evaluation adopted from statistics. We stress the importance of accounting for the in-
formation structure of the programs evaluated. In particular, the Lucas (1976) critique
of early structural econometrics applies to the current generation of dynamic treatment-
eects models. Methods for computing the optimal dynamic assignment of programs
developed in statistics are not directly useful to economic policy makers.
Section 4 reviews an alternative, event-history approach to the microeconometric eval-
uation problem. We clarify some of the fundamental problems that arise in the analysis
of such models by rephrasing a canonical version as a simultaneous-equations model.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1
See Heckman (2000), who reects extensively on the twentieth-century history of causal analysis, in
particular policy evaluation, in economics. Goldberger (1972) provides a historical account of structural-
equations methods.
2
2 Some background
2.1 A continued interest in structural-equations models
The early structural-equations models were typically not based on explicit models of
the behavior of individual agents. Also, strong restrictions were placed on functional
forms| models were typically linear with normal errors. Over time, structural models
have gained considerably in economic-theoretic sophistication. In particular, dynamic
structural models with forward-looking agents and heterogeneity are routinely used now.
However, for the sake of tractability and computational convenience, they have mostly
remained low-dimensional.
2
The recent \treatment-eects" literature in econometrics seeks to evaluate programs
without making the strong functional-form assumptions that are typically made in struc-
tural econometrics. Most of this literature focuses on static problems and econometri-
cians have developed a wide variety of robust statistical methods based on instrumental-
variables and conditional-independence assumptions for this case.
3
Their statistical ro-
bustness has brought these methods wide popularity, but the lack of economic-theoretical
foundations has sparked discussions on their economic relevance.
4
Along with the treatment-eects literature, a closely related literature on explicit non-
parametric structural models has developed. Again, the focus is on robust analysis of
relatively simple, static problems. This literature is, more explicitly than the treatment-
eects literature, grounded in the earlier literature on structural-equations models. Among
its advances are the development of non-parametric two-stage methods that are closely
related to Theil's (1953) two-stage least squares method.
5
2.2 Randomized experiments
The static potential-outcome framework of Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974) is extensively
used in the statistical and econometric evaluation literature. We briey discuss it here to
introduce some basic concepts and notation.
Suppose we are interested in the causal eect of a treatment on some outcome. The
2
Rust (1994) discusses the estimation of sophisticated, but usually highly parametric, dynamic struc-
tural models. More recently, structural econometrics has turned to the specication and identication
of dynamic structural models that are less tightly specied. For example, Taber (2000) and Magnac
and Thesmar (2002) discuss identication of dynamic discrete-choice models under general conditions.
Another example is Abbring and Campbell (2003), who discuss identication of structural models of rm
growth, learning, and survival.
3
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) provide a review of the use of such methods in labor economics.
4
See e.g. Heckman (1997), Heckman and Vytlacil (2000a), and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000).
5
See e.g. Angrist and Imbens (1995), Blundell and Powell (2000), and Imbens and Newey (2001).
3
treatment takes its values in some set D. In the most basic setup, D = f0; 1g. Then,
the point 1 represents assignment to a treatment group and the point 0 assignment to
a control group. Alternatively D could be R
+
:= [0;1), representing a continuum of
doses of some medication. To each treatment d 2 D corresponds a random variable Y
d
,
the potential outcome in the case that we would intervene and assign treatment d. The
randomness of Y
d
may represent both ex ante heterogeneity between individuals and ex
post shocks.
Causal inference is concerned with contrasting potential outcomes corresponding to
dierent treatments. Because the treatments are mutually exclusive, we can never observe
potential outcomes corresponding to dierent treatments simultaneously. In the words of
Dawid (2000), potential outcomes are complementary. This is what Holland (1986) calls
the \fundamental problem of causal inference".
Suppose that treatment is assigned according to aD-valued random variableD. Again,
the randomness in D may reect both ex ante heterogeneity that aects the assignment of
treatment, and ex post shocks like those arising from explicit randomization of treatment
assignment. The actual outcome Y and the potential outcomes fY
d
g are linked by a
natural consistency condition,
6
Assumption 1. Consistency. Y = Y
D
.
Assumption 1 states that the actual outcome is simply the potential outcome correspond-
ing to the treatment actually assigned to the individual.
In a randomized experiment, which is the focus of Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974),
D??fY
d
g. For now, we maintain this assumption. Suppose that we are interested in the
eect of the treatment on the means (d) := E [Y
d
], d 2 D. In a randomized experiment,
(D) = E [Y jD] almost surely. So, under some additional smoothness assumptions, we
can estimate  by standard non-parametric regression techniques.
The consistency condition in Assumption 1 is closely connected to Rubin's (1986)
stable-unit-treatment-value assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA requires that potential out-
comes for any given subject are independent of the treatment assignment mechanism and
of the treatments assigned to other subjects. Thus, SUTVA ensures that we do not have
to index potential outcomes by treatments assigned to other subjects or by the assignment
mechanism used. More generally, it requires that all (versions of) treatments are repre-
sented in D. In economics, violations of SUTVA typically arise if we only index treatments
by the agents' own treatment and there are (e.g. strategic) interactions between agents
6
We assume that fY
d
; d 2 Dg is a measurable stochastic process. This ensures that Y
D
is a random
variable (by application of Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 13.1). In the binary-treatment case this is trivial.
In the sequel, we will implicitly assume that such measurability issues are settled.
4
or equilibrium eects of the program under study. We will argue later that equilibrium
eects are particularly important in dynamic econometric program evaluation.
SUTVA ensures that we can specify fY
d
g independently of the treatment assignment
rule D. Economists would rather say that fY
d
g is autonomous, or structurally invariant
(Frisch, 1938; see also Aldrich, 1989, and Hendry and Morgan, 1995). Indeed, under
randomized assignment and SUTVA, we can interpret the Neyman-Rubin framework as
a completely specied non-parametric structural model.
7
First, the process fY
d
g is, of
course, simply a random function d 2 D 7! Y
d
and therefore, under SUTVA, a non-
parametric structural equation with non-separable errors. Second, the most obvious in-
terpretation of randomized assignment is that treatment is not causally aected by the
outcome and that there are no common determinants of treatment and outcome. For-
mally, we could posit a second autonomous function y 2 Y 7! D
y
that gives the treat-
ment for each hypothetically assigned outcome, and add a consistency condition D = D
Y
.
Then, in our interpretation randomized assignment boils down two the assumptions that
(i) fD
y
g??fY
d
g and (ii) D
y
= D
y
0
for all y; y
0
2 Y. Altogether, this gives a recursive
structural model (fY
d
g; D) with independent, non-separable errors.
The Neyman-Rubin model can be enriched by including covariates X that are not
causally aected by either treatment or outcomes, but that may aect both treatment
and outcomes. Analogously to the simple model above, we can assume that treatment
assignment is randomized conditional on X. In obvious notation, this gives a model
(fY
dx
g; fD
x
g; X) with fY
dx
g, fD
x
g and X independent. This framework allows for the
evaluation of policies that involve proling on X in the assignment of D. Even this
extended framework, however, does not cover data nor policies that involve (self-)selection
on unobservables. These are typically of considerable importance in economics, and the
applicability of this framework is therefore limited (e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1995 and
1997). We postpone further discussion of observed covariates to Section 3, and rst discuss
some models that allow for selection on unobservables.
2.3 Instrumental variables
In response to the limitation of the basic Neyman-Rubin framework to (stratied) ran-
domized experiments, statisticians and econometricians have extended the framework to
include instrumental variables. Here, we follow the expositions of Imbens and Angrist
(1994) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2000b), which cover the case of a binary treatment
(i.e. D = f0; 1g).
The Neyman-Rubin model with instrumental variables Z can be represented as (fY
d
g; fD
z
g; Z),
7
The close link between the potential-outcomes model and structural models has been discussed by
e.g. Pearl (2000).
5
with D
z
= I(p(z)  U), Z??(fY
d
g; U), and consistency of potential and actual treatments
and outcomes:
Assumption 2. Consistency. D = D
Z
and Y = Y
D
.
Here, p(Z) = Pr(D = 1jZ) is the propensity score at Z, and U is a uniformly distributed
random variable. Z causally aects treatment D, but does not aect the outcome Y
directly and is not related to the error in the structural equation fY
d
g. The latent-variable
representation of fD
z
g embodies Imbens and Angrist's (1994) monotonicity assumption
without imposing additional structure on the model (Vytlacil, 2002).
Unlike the model of the previous subsection, this model allows for dependence of fY
d
g
and fD
z
g. However, it does not specify the source of this dependence. The most ob-
vious interpretation of the model is that it is a reduced form of a recursive structural
model (fY
dv
g; fD
zv
g; Z; V ) with fY
dv
g, fD
zv
g, Z, V all independent and V some random
variable that is unobserved to the analyst (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000a).
8
How-
ever, in closely related settings with a continuous D, econometricians have entertained a
simultaneous-equations interpretation of the dependence of fY
d
g and fD
z
g (e.g. Blundell
and Powell, 2000). Without imposing further structure, we can learn about the causal
eects of the instrument Z on Y from the reduced form (f(Y
D
z
; D
z
)g; Z) in which Y and
D are jointly determined by Z.
9
If Z is a policy instrument, and not just a statistical in-
strument, the reduced-form eect of Z on Y is of direct policy interest. However, without
further structure, an empirical analysis of the model is not informative on the eects of
manipulations of the treatment D that cannot be expressed in terms of Z. In this sense,
the traditional objective of linear instrumental-variables analysis seems to have been lost
in the drive to non-parametric methods, in favor of reduced-form analysis.
The debate on this issue has focused on the multiplicity of treatment-eect parameters
that can be dened in the present context, and the lack of invariance of certain parameters
to the choice of instruments Z (see Heckman, 1997, and the discussion following it). In
this light, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) argue that econometric interest should focus on
policy-relevant treatment eects (PRTEs). A PRTE can be dened as the mean causal
eect on the outcome Y of changing the distribution of the instrument Z from some
8
The vector V may include observed covariates, which we ignore for now. Even then, V is typically in
part unobserved as it has include suÆciently many variables to make all assumed independencies hold.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000a) ensure this by taken V so large that fY
dv
g and fD
zv
g are degenerate.
Alternatively, one may leave scope for external ex post random shocks.
9
It is a text-book fact that the reduced form is a useful tool for analyzing the eect of an \exogenous"
variable (e.g. Theil, 1971, Section 9.1). In the present general setting, this has been pointed out by
Heckman (1997). Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) discuss the case in which Z is an intention-to-treat
variable under control of the analist, and D is actual treatment. Also, Blundell and Powell (2000) discuss
this issue in their slightly dierent framework.
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distribution G to some other distribution G

,
PRTE
G;G

:=
Z
(z)dG

(z) 
Z
(z)dG(z);
with (z) now dened as E [Y
D
z
]. Because Z??fY
D
z
g, we have that E [(Z)] = E [Y jZ]
almost surely, in analogy to the case of a randomized experiment. Therefore, under some
obvious support conditions, the PRTE of changing the distribution of Z from G to G

can be directly identied from the reduced form regression E jY jZ], and is given by
PRTE
G;G

:=
Z
E [Y jZ = z]dG

(z) 
Z
E [Y jZ = z]dG(z):
Ichimura and Taber (2000) develop direct estimators of PRTEs based on this idea.
Clearly, even if we focus on treatment-eects analysis that is policy-relevant in the
sense discussed above, we need instrumental variables| to span a non-trivial policy space.
We can, however, do without instrumental-variable estimators. This raises the question
what instrument-variable methods are good for in the present non-parametric context.
The answer has to be that a PRTE is an eect of Z on Y that is channelled through
participation D, and that it is natural and informative to analyze this PRTEs in terms
of fY
d
g and fD
z
g (i.e. p(z)). The instrumental-variables approach to policy evaluation
provides such an alternative cut of the data. Heckman and Vytlacil (2000b, 2001) show
that both the PRTE and all (non-PRTE) treatment-eect parameters that are usually
dened on fY
d
g can be expressed in terms of the marginal treatment eect
MTE(U) := E [Y
1
  Y
0
jU ]
at propensity U (see Bjorklund and MoÆt, 1987).
10
They develop estimators of the PRTE
based on local instrumental-variables estimators of MTEs.
Provided that Z has some structural meaning, which it presumably should have if its
use has to successfully defended, the margins of participation on which the MTEs are
dened are of structural interest. Then, the alternative cut of the data is of interest as
well. Nevertheless, the main role of the instruments is now to span the set of policies
that can be considered. An analyst that has access to a richer set of instruments can
compute treatment eects at a ner partition of margins of participation. This superiorly
informed analist can therefore compute the eects of a wider range of policies that aect
participation through the instruments. But, if the policy of interest involves manipulation
of only a subset of instruments that are available to both analysts, both can compute the
relevant PRTEs| from their own MTEs if they like| and would come to exactly the same
policy conclusions. Unlike the MTE, the PRTE is invariant to the choice of instruments.
This choice only aects the range of policy interventions that can be considered.
10
Imbens and Angrist's (1994) LATE can be expressed in MTEs provided certain dierentiability
conditions hold. With a truly binary instrument, for example, a LATE can be dened, but not an MTE.
7
Example 1. Suppose that Z = (Q;R) with Q??R both scalar and p(Z) = F (Q+R), for
some distribution function F . Suppose that (fY
d
g; fD
z
g; Z) satises the Neyman-Rubin
framework with instrumental variables Z = (Q;R). Now suppose there is a second analyst
that only observes R and not Q. This analyst could compute a propensity score ~p(R) =
Pr(D = 1jR) = E [F (Q + R)jR] and dene D
r
= I(~p(r) 
~
U) for some uniform random
variable
~
U??(fY
d
g; fD
r
g). The resulting model (fY
d
g; fD
r
g; R) satises the Neyman-
Rubin framework with instrumental variables R and is consistent with the original model
if we take
~
U = ~p(r) F (Q+ r)+U . The MTEs that can be measured by the second, less
informed analyst are E [Y
1
  Y
0
j
~
U ] = E [MTE(U)j
~
U ]. Note that (
~
U)  (U) (strictly),
so that E [Y
1
  Y
0
j
~
U ] is an aggregate of the MTEs identies by the rst observer (here,
(U) is the -algebra generated by U , etcetera). Nevertheless, both analysts can compute
PRTEs that involve a change in the distribution of R only, either from their reduced-form
regressions or from their respective MTEs.
2.4 Stability and autonomy
Clearly, SUTVA in statistics is closely related to the concept of autonomy in structural-
equations modelling. In economic applications, violations of SUTVA can therefore be
expected for the same reasons that autonomy has been disputed. We illustrate this with
an example, the Roy model.
Example 2. This example closely follows Heckman and Honore (1989) and Heckman and
Vytlacil (2000a). The basic Roy model can be written as (fY
d
g; D), with D = I(Y
1
 Y
0
)
and consistency as in Assumption 1. Clearly, fY
d
g and D are dependent. The model is
typically interpreted as a reduced form of (fY
dv
g; fD
v
g; V ); with D
v
= I(Y
1v
 Y
0v
) and
fY
dv
g, fD
v
g and V independent (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000a). For the model to be
fully structural, we need autonomy of all three equations of the model (implying SUTVA
on fY
dv
g as before). This is not guaranteed in economic applications. Suppose that Y
are earnings and D is sectoral choice, as in the original Roy model. Let V be skills.
The sector choice D
v
is based on the earnings in both sectors for a given set of skills
v. Now, if the distribution of skills V changes, this may aect skill prices and therefore
both fY
dv
g and fD
v
g. This is an example of the most typical violation of autonomy
in economic applications of the treatment-eects approach, market equilibrium eects
(Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). It should be noted though that autonomy may
even fail to hold if skill prices are exogenous, but agents have rational expectations. This
is a manifestation of Lucas's (1976) critique. It can be resolved by including skill prices
in V . This, however, either greatly increases data requirements, or reduces applicability
of the model| to experiments that do not change the aggregate skill distribution.
8
The example links violation of SUTVA, an assumption explicitly made in statisti-
cal treatment-eects analysis, to the well-known violation of autonomy due to rational-
expectations eects (Lucas, 1976). This will be particularly relevant in the dynamic case.
3 Treatment eects in discrete time
3.1 Introduction
One problem that has mostly been ignored in the econometric treatment-eects litera-
ture and the related literature on non-parametric structural models is the fact that policy
evaluation problems are usually dynamic. Economic programs are announced and imple-
mented in real time. Economic agents act, in particular enroll in programs, dynamically.
In some evaluation studies it may be possible to phrase the problem and organize the data
such that it ts the static setup. More often, the proper economic interpretation of pa-
rameters and identifying assumptions is hard if a dynamic problem is framed as a static
problem. Standard statistical approaches may fail to estimate or test anything useful.
This is particularly true if outcomes are inherently dynamic variables like unemployment
durations (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003).
Biostatisticians face similar problems in the analysis of the causal eects of complex
dynamic medical treatments on health outcomes. In response, they have developed meth-
ods based on dynamic extensions of the Neyman-Rubin potential-outcome model that
underlies the static treatment methods (e.g. Robins, 1986, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Gill and
Robins, 2001; Lok, 2001). Econometricians have recently explored the possibility of using
these models in dynamic economic policy evaluation (e.g. Lechner and Miquel, 2002).
Because the more recent treatment literature is explicitly dynamic, it does not suer from
the fundamental problems associated with the application of static models to dynamic
problems. Of course, a dynamic structural model with explicit and precise assumptions
about behavior, information and market conditions would not suer from such problems
anyhow. It generates potential outcomes and program assignment rules as a by-product.
However, the dynamic treatment-eect setup allows a more generic discussion of statis-
tical methods and may lead to the development of robust statistical methods as for the
static model (e.g. Lechner, 2003).
In a dynamic version of the Neyman-Rubin framework, the risk of under-representation
of treatments| violation of SUTVA| is considerable. Not only should we account for
all relevant aggregate conditions; we should also include all informational events related
to the treatment under study in the treatment index. We will discuss this in more detail
next.
9
3.2 Sequential randomization
In a series of papers, Robins has extended the static Neyman-Rubin model with selection
on observables to a dynamic setting. Here, we briey review this extension, following the
exposition of Gill and Robins (2001). We slightly rephrase their setup to highlight some
dynamic features that are of particular interest to economics. We point out that SUTVA,
considered to be pivotal in the statistical literature, is particularly likely to be violated in
econometric applications.
Consider an evaluation study in which measurements are taken and treatment decisions
are made at T +1 <1 distinct times 0; 1; 2; : : : ; T . Let T := f0; 1; : : : ; Tg. At each time
t 2 T , \prognostic" factors W (t) are measured and a treatment decision D(t) is made.
The prognostic factors W (t) = (Y (t); X(t)) consist of R
k
-valued intermediate outcomes
of interest Y (t) and other prognostic factors X(t). The only dierence between Y (t) and
X(t) is that we are interested in causal inference on the eects of treatment on the former,
but only include the latter to control for dynamic selection on observables. Some time
after T , say at time T + 1, some nal R
k
-valued outcome Y (T + 1) is measured. Denote

W (t) := (W (0); : : : ;W (t)),

D(t) := (D(0); : : : ; D(t)), and

Y (t) := (Y (0); : : : ; Y (t)). Let

W :=

W (T ),

D :=

D(T ), and

Y =

Y (T + 1). For expositional convenience, let

W and

D
be discrete.
11
As discussed at the end of Subsection 2.2, we will contrast outcomes between policies
that assign treatments contingent on (the history of) covariates. In the treatment-eects
literature, such policies are called treatment regimes or plans. A treatment regime g
species a treatment given available data w(t) at each time t 2 T . So, it is a collection of
(non-random
12
) functions (g
t
; t 2 T ) such that d(t) = g
t
( w(t)) is the treatment assigned at
time t if prognostic factors w(t) are observed. Dene g
t
( w(t)) := (g
0
( w(0)); : : : ; g
t
( w(t))).
If there is no risk of confusion, we abbreviate g
t
and g
t
as g. Denote the set of all treatment
plans by G. A static treatment regime is a plan g 2 G such that w(t) 7! g( w(t)) is a trivial
function of the covariates (w(1); : : : ; w(t)) for all t 2 T . Note that we do allow treatments
specied by static plans to be contingent on the \initial conditions" w(0). Denote the set
of static treatment plans by G
0
 G.
Example 3. If T = 0, we are back in the static model. There are only static treatment
plans, i.e. G = G
0
, which are (possibly trivial) mappings w(0) 7! g(w(0)).
We restrict attention to treatment regimes that are observable.
11
Gill and Robins (2001) show that the analyses can be straightforwardly extended to the case of
continuous

W and

D under some auxiliary regularity conditions.
12
It is straightforward to generalize the analysis to random plans (e.g. Gill and Robins, 2001). Such
plans randomize treatment choices conditional on the treatment and covariate histories. See also Subsec-
tion 3.5.
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Assumption 3. Observability of treatment regimes. For all treatment regimes g 2 G
Pr
 

W (t) = w(t);

D(t  1) =

d(t  1)

> 0 =) Pr
 

W (t) = w(t);

D(t) =

d(t)

> 0 (1)
for all

d(t) and w(t) such that

d(t) = g( w(t)), t 2 T .
Here and in the sequel it is implicitly understood that events like

D( 1) =

d( 1)
should be ignored. So, for t = 0 the rst probability in equation (1) should be read
as Pr
 

W (0) = w(0)

.
We attach a vector of potential outcomes

Y
g
to each treatment plan g. Each

Y
g
is
an R
k(T+2)
-valued random variable. The potential outcomes are again connected to the
actual outcomes by a consistency condition,
Assumption 4. Consistency.

Y =

Y
g
on the event f

D = g(

W )g.
This condition is usually strengthened, either implicitly or explicitly, by adding
Assumption 5. No anticipation.

Y (t) =

Y
g
(t) on the event f

D(t   1) = g(

W (t   1))g
for all t 2 T .
Assumption 4 is the direct equivalent of the consistency condition in the static Neyman-
Rubin model. Assumption 5 is discussed extensively below. Its suggestive name is not
taken from statistics, but follows Abbring and Van den Berg (2003).
Statistical inference typically relies on a sequential randomization assumption,
Assumption 6. Sequential randomization. For all t 2 T
D(t)??(Y
g
(t+ 1); : : : ; Y
g
(T + 1))j(

W (t);

D(t  1) = g(

X(t  1))):
Assumption 6 is a sequential version of the conditional independence assumption that
underlies e.g. statistical matching. It does allow for so called observed \dynamic con-
founders", variables that both are intermediate outcomes of past treatment and aect
future treatment decisions. With Assumption 6, the dynamic potential-outcome model
set up so far is a natural dynamic extension of the Neyman-Rubin model for a static
(stratied) randomized experiment.
Under Assumptions 3{6, the g-computation formula can be used to compute the
(marginal) distribution of the potential outcome Y
g
from the joint distribution of the
factual data (

X;

D;

Y ).
Proposition 1. G-computation formula. If Assumptions 3{6 hold, the distribution of

Y
g
follows from
Pr
 

Y
g
2 B

=
X
w(0)
  
X
w(T )
Pr
 

Y 2 Bj

W (T ) = w(T );

D(T ) = g( w(T ))


T
Y
t=0
Pr
 
W (t) = w(t)j

W (t  1) = w(t  1);

D(t  1) = g( w(t  1))

(2)
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for any Borel set B  R
k(T+2)
.
For any (Assumption 3) observable treatment g, Proposition 1 ensures identication of
the joint distribution of

Y
g
from the distribution of (

X;

D;

Y ) under Assumptions 4, 5,
and 6.
Assumptions 4 and 5 impose a natural recursive structure on the potential-outcomes
model. In particular, they demand that outcomes

Y
g
(t) and

Y
g
0
(t) corresponding to treat-
ment plans g and g
0
coincide if the treatments actually assigned under the plans coincide
up to time t   1, i.e. g
t 1
(

W (t   1)) = g
0
t 1
(

W (t   1)). In particular, Assumption 5
requires that Y
g
(0) = Y
g
0
(0) = Y (0) for all treatment plans g; g
0
2 G. So, we do not
allow for causal eects of treatment on Y (0). This is natural as Y (0) is a pre-treatment
variable.
In the g-computation formula (1) in Proposition 1, Assumptions 4 and 5 allow an
attractive (semi-)causal interpretation of the factor
Pr
 
W (t) = w(t)j

W (t  1) = w(t  1);

D(t  1) = g( w(t  1))

as
Pr
 
Y
g
(t) = y(t); X(t) = x(t)j

W (t  1) = w(t  1);

D(t  1) = g( w(t  1))

:
Note that Assumption 4 is not suÆcient for this to be true, because, unlike Assumption 5,
it does not guarantee that outcomes at time t 2 T are not aected by future treatment.
Also note that we could trivially generate a full causal interpretation by assuming the
existence of counterfactuals

X
g
and imposing conditions like Assumptions 4 and 5 on

X
and

X
g
as well (or, equivalently, including all covariates in

Y (T ) and none in

X).
Assumption 5 is particularly natural if the outcome is survival of a patient. In this
case, let Y = Y (T + 1) be a nonnegative continuous survival time. Let Y (t) := I(Y > t)
indicate survival up to measurement time t, t 2 T . Then, Assumption 5 imposes that
treatment after death does not aect survival. The g-computation formula (2) reduces to
Pr (Y
g
> y) =
X
x(0)
  
X
x(T
y
)
Pr
 
Y > yj

X(T
y
) = x(T
y
);

D(T
y
) = g( w(T
y
)); Y > T
y


T
y
Y
t=0
Pr
 
X(t) = x(t)j

X(t  1) = x(t  1);

D(t  1) = g( w(t  1)); Y > t

 Pr
 
Y > tj

X(t  1) = x(t  1);

D(t  1) = g( w(t  1)); Y > t  1

for all y 2 (0;1), where T
y
:= maxft 2 T : t < yg is the last measurement time before
y. A simplication of equation (2) arises because (i) only the covariate and treatment
history up to T
y
matters for inference on the probability of the event fY
g
> yg and (ii)
12
only covariate paths w(T
y
) = (y(T
y
); x(T
y
)) such that y(T
y
) = 1 produce nonzero terms
in the g-computation formula.
Propositions 1 establishes identication under Assumptions 3{6. We also have
Proposition 2. Given any distribution of the factual data (

X;

D;

Y ), random variables

X,

D,

Y and

Y
g
, g 2 G, can be constructed that satisfy Assumptions 4{6.
Proof. See Gill and Robins (2001, Section 6). Their analysis only involves causal inference
on a nal outcome (i.e. our Y (T + 1)) and does not rest on Assumption 5. Their proof
does however apply directly here.
Gill and Robins conclude that the model assumptions are \neutral", \for free", or \harm-
less". As we will argue later, from an econometric perspective some of the model assump-
tions, notably| as its name suggests| Assumption 5, can be interpreted as substan-
tial behavioral/informational assumptions. In this sense, econometricians may prefer to
phrase the neutrality result more negatively as a non-identication result (Abbring and
Van den Berg, 2003).
3.2.1 Path analysis
The dynamic model of the previous section may seem disappointing to an econometrician
used to dynamic econometric models. First, even though the extended model explicitly
recognizes causal eects of treatment on intermediate outcomes| one aspect of dynamic
confounding| it leaves the second aspect of dynamic confounding, the eect of interme-
diate outcomes on treatment choice, implicit. In biostatistics an asymmetric treatment{
outcome setup may indeed be the most natural. In economics, however, we may be as
interested in the eects of outcomes on treatment choices. Indeed, more often than not,
the \treatment" versus \outcome" terminology does not do justice to the problem at hand
and a more symmetric, \simultaneous-equations" approach is more appropriate. Second,
even though we have pursued a dynamic outcomes model, we have ended up with a frame-
work that is essentially a trivial extension of the static potential-outcomes model. After
all, we have not specied a dynamic model of the outcomes per se. Rather, we have
focused on the joint determination of the outcome path by the treatment path. Thus,
this model does not allow for the type of dynamic causal path analysis that economic
problems often call for.
Example 4. Consider the evaluation of a system of government labor market programs
that dynamically provides agents with access to various training programs, job search
assistance schemes, etcetera. The model set up so far suggests dening sequences of la-
bor market outcomes (wages, labor market status, earnings) and (treatment) indicators
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of program participation over the course of the agents' labor market careers. An under-
lying causal structure follows by dening appropriate program plans and corresponding
potential outcomes. Under the standard assumptions, such a framework would allow for
inference on the outcomes that would have occurred under any one specic participation
plan.
Now consider the problem faced by a policy maker who only controls part of the partic-
ipation plan. For example, the policy maker could be in charge of a youth general training
program for school-leavers that do not nd jobs quickly. The present framework would
allow the policy maker to contrast potential outcomes between hypothetical participation
and non-participation in the youth training program evaluated at the actual participation
status in the remainder of their careers (see Lechner and Miquel, 2002, for an example of
this approach). However, this contrast would not reect the overall eect of the youth
training program on labor market outcomes, because it disables any eects of participa-
tion in the program on future participation in programs that are not under the control
of the policy maker. Thus, the measured eect is a direct eect only. Alternatively, the
policy maker could index potential outcomes by the participation in the program under
his control only.
13
Such a model would allow for inference on the overall eect of the
youth program, but not on the causal pathways leading there.
Typically, policy makers will be interested in such pathways. For example, the youth
training program may benet the agent through direct employability eects or may rather
facilitate later participation in programs that have such eects. A full dynamic causal
analysis therefore requires a complete causal model of the dynamic determination of out-
comes and program participation.
Structural econometrics often delivers such models, but the basic asymmetric treatment{
response setup does not. However, as noted before, potential-outcome models can be
seen as non-parametric structural models (in this context, see Robins, 1997, and Pearl,
2000). We could simply enrich the asymmetric setup to the level of a standard structural
model by modelling the causal determination of treatment. Rather than distinguishing
treatments and responses, we can model all causal relations within the collection of vari-
ables fD(0); : : : ; D(T );Y (0); : : : ; Y (T +1)g. The natural extension of the basic potential-
outcomes setup is a model in which (i) all causal relations are backward-looking, with
D(t) temporarily ordered after Y (t) in each period t 2 T , and (ii) the structural errors
are mutually independent. Such a fully recursive system is trivially identied and imposes
no structure on the factual data.
13
Obviously, such potential outcomes would not be stable under changes in the process of later program
enrollment. This is not a problem, as long as the evaluation results are used in an, in this dimension,
unchanged environment.
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The use of recursive systems, usually represented by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs),
is standard in statistical causal modelling (e.g. Pearl, 2000). The result that the factual
data can be represented by a recursive causal system with independent errors is, because of
the lack of structure, trivial. It could be seen as a non-parametric variant on Wold's more
substantial result for the linear normal model in economics. In this context, economists
have worried about simultaneity and the autonomy (and therefore causal interpretation)
of the equations in a (non-unique) recursive representation.
14
Statisticians seem to worry
less about such issues, presumably because they are non-statistical problems.
3.3 The information structure of economic programs
In economic program evaluation,

Y typically consists of wage, employment or earnings
outcomes (see e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, for a review). The programs
under evaluation can be anything from training and job search assistance programs to
unemployment benets programs.
The problem of program heterogeneity is well-understood in the context of the static
framework. If multiple versions of programs are oered, it is important to represent all
versions in the potential-outcomes model. If versions are aggregated into broad categories,
SUTVA is violated because potential outcomes depend on the mechanism used to assign
treatment versions (Rubin, 1986). Program heterogeneity will plague dynamic evaluation
studies in the same way. We will now argue that in dynamic econometric program evalua-
tion, we should in particular worry about the incomplete specication of the informational
structure of programs under study.
A naive specication of treatment plans would be sets of static or dynamic rules for
participation in training or job search assistance and varying the benets level, respec-
tively. Static rules simply stipulate times at which agents (are oered to) participate in
certain programs or benets are changed. Dynamic rules would make these events contin-
gent on the covariate and outcome history. Either way, treatment plans would be dened
in terms of actual participation in programs. Such a naive specication is incomplete in
the context of economies inhabited by rational forward-looking agents.
Assumption 5 is usually read as requiring that each cause should precede its eect.
Outcomes

Y (t) up to time t are not causally aected by treatment choices after t. In
the econometric setup sketched above, this seems to exclude anticipatory eects of future
participation in training or job search assistance and future changes in benets. Such
eects are routinely predicted by economic-theoretic models with forward-looking agents.
However, this is a false impression due to an incomplete account of causes and, as a
14
See e.g. the discussion of work by Marshak, Havelmoo and Wold on simultaneous equations in Hendry
and Morgan (1995).
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consequence, an incomplete characterization of treatments. Anticipatory eects of future
events are not caused by those events, but are triggered by signals containing information
about these events. Once we include all causes, both signals and actual participation in
programs, in the model, the recursive structure of Assumption 5 is natural. In terms
of Rubin (1986), we have dierent versions of the treatments corresponding to dierent
signals. We have to ensure that all versions of the treatments are represented to guarantee
stability.
Example 5. Let T = 1. Suppose that the outcome Y (t) in period t is (discretized)
earnings, t = 0; 1; 2, and that there are no covariates

W . At time 1, agents are either
oered a slot in a training program at a school (d(1) = 1) or they are not (d(1) = 0). All
agents that are oered a slot actually enroll in the program and there are no substitute
programs available to agents that are not oered a slot at the school under study.
The training program is not fully characterized by specifying the assignment of slots
at time 1. At time 0 the school sends letters to the agents. The letters state whether the
agents will be oered a slot in the program at time 1 or not. This can be modelled as a
binary signal, i.e. d(0) = 1 if the letter claims that a slot will be available and d(0) = 0
otherwise.
If we would have naively indexed treatments by d(1) only, we would have multiple
versions of each treatment. Within classes of treatments dened by d(1) = 0 and d(1) = 1,
respectively, we can distinguish treatments such that d(0) = 0 and treatments such that
d(0) = 1. If the signals are informative (see below), this would lead to a violation of
SUTVA.
We are interested in causal inference on the eect of the training program, consisting
of the letter at time 0 and the training slot at time 1, on pre-program wages Y (0) and Y (1)
and post-program wages Y (2). Without covariates

X, the relevant training (treatment)
plans g = (g
0
; g
1
) specify a signal d(0) = g
0
(y(0)) for each wage y(0) 2 supp(Y (0)) and
a training oer d(1) = g
1
(y(1)) for each pair of wages y(1) 2 supp(

Y (1)). As we have
included all signals in the model, it is natural to impose Assumption 5.
Black et al. (1999) illustrate the relevance of this example. They analyze the eect of
compulsory training and employment services provided to unemployment insurance (UI)
claimants in Kentucky on the exit rate from UI and earnings. In the program under
study, letters are sent out to notify agents some time ahead whether they are selected to
participate in the program. This information is recorded in a database and is available
to Black et al. The main empirical nding of the paper is that the threat of future
mandatory training conveyed by the letters is more eective in increasing the UI exit rate
than training itself.
The data used by Black et al. carefully record the signals provided to agents. In
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general, if full records are kept of all interactions between administrators of programs and
the agents to which the programs are provided and if we are able to properly translate these
records in program sequences that include all relevant signals the standard framework with
Assumption 4 can be applied.
In many econometric applications, the information on the program under study is less
rich. Data sets may provide information on actual participation in training programs and
some background information on how the program is administered in general. Typically,
however, data do not keep track of all letters sent to agents nor of each phone conversation
between administrators and agents. In this case, we can make various assumptions on how
agents collect information on the program. Possibly, allocations of slots in the program
are announced a xed period of time ahead of actual enrollment and agents respond to
the announcement. Alternatively, no advance notice is given at all.
We can only guarantee SUTVA if we make explicit assumptions on the informational
structure of the program. Such assumptions are unavoidable by Proposition 2, which
implies that we can impose the recursive structure of Assumption 5 without restricting
the factual data. This is equivalent to assuming that no advance notice is given. In many
application, general institutional information can be used to justify specic informational
assumptions.
Example 6. Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) analyze the eect of punitive
benets reductions, or sanctions, in Dutch UI on re-employment rates. In the Nether-
lands, UI claimants have to comply with certain rules concerning search behavior and
registration. If a claimant violates these rules, a sanction may be applied. A sanction
is a punitive reduction in benets for some period of time and may be accompanied by
increased levels of monitoring by the UI agency. See Grubb (1999) for a review of sanction
systems in the OECD. The data used in Abbring et al. are administrative and provide
the re-employment duration, the duration at which a sanction is imposed if a sanction is
imposed and some background characteristics for each UI case.
Without any prior knowledge of the Dutch UI system, one can make a variety of
informational assumptions. In one extreme, UI claimants know at the start of their UI
spells that benets will be reduced at some specic duration if they are still claiming UI
at that duration. This results in a UI system with entitlement periods that are tailored
to individual claimants and that are set and revealed at the start of the UI spells. In this
case, claimants will change their labor market behavior from the start of their UI spell
in response to the future benets reduction (e.g. Mortensen, 1977). In another extreme,
claimants receive no prior signals of impending sanctions and there are no anticipatory
eects of actual benets reductions. However, agents may still be aware of the properties
of the sanctions process and to some extent controlling this process. Abbring et al.
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analyze a search model with these features. The data cannot distinguish between both
informational assumptions (see Subsection 4.2 for details). However, Abbring et al. use
institutional background information to argue in favor of the latter assumption.
3.4 Equilibrium eects
The discussion in the previous section is partial in the sense that it does not specify
how signals are interpreted by agents. The same signal may be interpreted dierently in
dierent environments. In rational expectations equilibrium, the informational content
attached to signals depends on the actual relation of signals to future treatment options
in the population. This implies that potential outcomes are not invariant to the choice
of the assignment mechanism. If we would consider a parametric class of assignment
mechanisms, the distributions of the potential outcomes would depend on the parameters
of the assignment process. In the terminology of Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983),
the assignment mechanism is not exogenous to the potential outcomes. Without further
qualications we have a violation of Rubin's (1986) SUTVA. Macroeconomists recognize
the Lucas (1976) critique.
This is akin to the problem of equilibrium eects of large-scale programs on prices
that has been discussed by Heckman et al. (1999) within the context of the static binary-
treatment potential-outcome model. They dierentiate between the no-treatment out-
come in a world with treatments and outcomes in a world without treatments. These are
not the same if the program under study is large and aects market outcomes. We have
discussed the example of the Roy model in Section 2.
Such eects may occur for large-scale dynamic programs as well. The informational
equilibrium eects may also occur for well-established small-scale programs. In this sense,
equilibrium eects are more likely to plague dynamic econometric evaluation studies than
static studies.
Example 2. (continued). Suppose that the signals carried by the letters are not con-
tingent on initial earnings Y (0) and that the assignment of slots by the school is not
contingent on the earnings history

Y (1). At time 0, the school randomly allocates signals
such that Pr(D(0) = 0) =
1
2
. We consider two cases for the training slot allocation at
time 1.
(i) the school randomly allocates training slots (D(1)??D(0)) such that Pr(D(1) =
0) =
1
2
;
(ii) the school allocates training slots to those agents who have received a letter claiming
that they will be oered a slot in the training program, i.e. D(1) = D(0).
18
First note that in Case (i) all training plans g are observable, i.e. satisfy Assumption 3.
In Case (ii), however, only plans such that g
0
(y(0)) = g
1
(y(1)) for some y(1) 2 supp(

Y (1))
are observable. In particular, the only static training plans that are observable are (0; 0)
and (1; 1). In either case, the distributions of the potential outcomes

Y
g
(2) corresponding
to the observable training plans g 2 G can be computed using the g-computation formula.
We should expect dierent outcomes in training programs (i) and (ii), even though
the programs have the same structure and treatments are indexed in the same way. In
rational equilibrium, the agent's expectations based on a signal d(0) should be consistent
with the conditional conditional distribution of training oers D(1)j(D(0) = d(0)) in the
population. So, in Case (i) all agents believe at time 0 that they will be oered a slot in
a program at time 1 with probability
1
2
. In this case, the signal is not informative and the
agents will not respond to it. In Case (ii), however, all agents will know for sure at time
1 whether they will be oered a slot in a program at time 2. Agents will respond to the
message in the letter from the school.
Example 2 shows that we should generally expect equilibrium eects to aect outcomes
in dynamic econometric evaluation studies. After all, agents can only value the signal
received at time 1 by rationally considering the relation between the signal and actual
assignment of training slots in the population. The potential outcomes thus depend on
the parameters of the assignment process. We further investigate this issue in a more
worked out example along the same lines.
Example 3. Again, let T = 1. Suppose that Y (t), t = 0; 1; 2, are binary employment
outcomes. More precisely, Y (t) = 0 if an agent is unemployed at time t and Y (t) = 1
if the agent is employed. For now, suppose that all agents are unemployed at time 0, so
that Y (0) = 0. Also, ignore covariates

X for the time being.
The agent operates in a simple job search environment. At the end of period 0, agents
receive a single job oer characterized by a wageW
1
drawn from a continuous distribution
F such that F (0) = 0. The agent can either accept the job or reject the job. If the agent
accepts the job oer W
1
, he is employed at the wage W
1
at both time 1 and time 2
(Y (1) = Y (2) = 1). If the agent rejects the job, he is unemployed at time 1 (Y (1) = 0).
An agent that is unemployed at time 1 receives another wage oer W
2
at the start of
period 2 that is drawn independently of W
1
from the same distribution F . At time 2,
the time 1 job oer W
1
cannot be recalled and the agent only has to decide whether to
accept or reject the new wage oer W
2
. If the agent accepts W
2
, he is employed at time
2 (Y (2) = 1) and receives compensation W
2
. Otherwise the agent is unemployed at time
2 (Y (2) = 0).
We are interested in evaluating the eect of a unemployment compensation program on
employment outcomes (suppose that wages are not observed). The program is organized
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as follows. All agents that are unemployed at time 1 receive unemployment benets b > 0.
At time 2, some agents loose entitlement to their benets (D(1) = 0), but others are still
entitled (D(1) = 1). Agents only actually receive benets if they are unemployed.
At time 0, agents receive a phone call from the unemployment benets agency in which
they are told whether they will (D(0) = 1) or will not (D(0) = 0) receive benets if they
are unemployed at time 2. As in Example 2, we cannot analyze the eect of this phone
call without some assumption on the information that is revealed. So, assume that agents
have rational expectations, (D(0); D(1))??(W
1
;W
2
), and that
Pr(D(0) = 0) = p;
Pr(D(1) = 0jD(0) = 0] = q
0
and
Pr(D(1) = 0jD(0) = 1] = q
1
(3)
for some parameters 0  p; q
0
; q
1
 1.
Agents choose to accept or reject W
1
and, if unemployed at time 1, W
2
so that total
income over times 1 and 2 is maximized. We ignore any income at time 0 because it cannot
be aected by behavior in our model. The agent's optimization problem is straightforward
to solve by backward induction.
If the agent is unemployed and entitled to benets b at time 2, he will only accept a
job oer W
2
 b. If the agent is unemployed and not entitled to benets at time 2, he
will accept any job oer W
2
 0. Therefore, the continuation value in unemployment at
time 1 given that the agent is entitled to benets at time 2 is
V
1
= b+ bF (b) + (1  F (b))E [W
2
jW
2
> b]
= 2b+
Z
1
b
(w   b)dF (w)
and the continuation value in unemployment at time 1 given that the agent is not entitled
to benets at time 2
V
0
= b + E [W
2
] < V
1
:
Now suppose that the agent believes at time 1 that he will be entitled to benets in
period 2 (if unemployed) with probability 1   q. With rational expectations, q = q
0
if
d(0) = 0 and q = q
1
if d(0) = 1. Let

V (q) := qV
0
+ (1   q)V
1
. Then, the agent accepts
any time 1 job oer W
1
that exceeds the perceived per period continuation value

V (q)=2
in unemployment.
We can distinguish 4 static treatments, (0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1) and (1; 1). All random-
ness in the corresponding potential outcomes originates in the oered wages W
1
and W
2
.
The distributions of the potential outcomes are easy to derive because of the assumed
independence of W
1
and W
2
.
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First, recall that we have assumed that Y
g
(0) is degenerate at 0 for all g. Next, at
time 0 agents that have received a signal d(0) have reservation wage

V (q
d(0)
)=2. So, we
have that
Pr(Y
(d(0);d(1))
(1) = 0) = F


V (q
d(0)
)
2

for d(0); d(1) = 0; 1.
Finally, agents that are employed at time 1 will be employed at time 2 for sure, i.e.
Pr(

Y
g
(2) = 1j

Y
g
(1) = 1) = 1
for all treatments g. Agents that are unemployed at time 1 and have d(1) = 0 lose their
benets and will be employed for sure at time 2. Unemployed agents with d(1) = 1 will
accept a job at time 2 with probability 1  F (b). So, we have that
Pr(Y
(d;0)
(2) = 0jY
(d;0)
(1) = 0) = 1 and
Pr(Y
(d;1)
(2) = 0jY
(d;1)
(1) = 0) = F (b)
for d = 0; 1.
The distributions of the potential outcomes depend on the parameters of the as-
signment process. In particular, V
0
(q) = V
0
  V
1
< 0. So, Pr(Y
(0;d)
(1) = 0) and
Pr(Y
(1;d)
(1) = 0) are decreasing in respectively q
0
and q
1
. This implies that SUTVA
is violated. Causal inference on the eect of the UI program without explicit reference to
the assignment mechanism is impossible.
Depending on the evaluation problem that is to be solved, we may be willing to select
a class of assignment mechanisms within which the potential outcomes are invariant. We
should then have data on a population for which benet plans are assigned according to a
mechanism in this class. The causal analysis has to be qualied as only providing causal
contrasts between UI plans assigned according to mechanisms in this class.
Note that outcomes only depend on q
0
and q
1
and not on p. Two examples stand
out. First, suppose that q
0
= q
1
=: q. Then, Pr(D(1) = 0) = q and the signal at time
0 is non-informative about the benets reduction. In this case, the outcomes are only
invariant if we x Pr(D(1) = 0). Second, let q
0
= 1 and q
1
= 0. Then, D(1) = D(0)
almost surely and outcomes are invariant to changes of Pr(D(1) = 0) = p over [0; 1].
Agents have perfect foresight about benets entitlement. Given the realized entitlement,
agents are not interested in the assignment mechanism.
In either case, we have to x (q
0
; q
1
) to ensure consistency. If we are interested in
evaluating outcomes for dierent values of (q
0
; q
1
), we have to index the potential outcomes
not only by

d(1) but also by (q
0
; q
1
). This would ensure that all versions of the treatment
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are represented and consistency holds. For this extended model to be operational, we
need variation of (q
0
; q
1
) in the data. Also, we have to consider a mechanism that assigns
(q
0
; q
1
) in a rst stage before the assignment of

d(1). We should check whether the new
potential outcomes, indexed by both

d(2) and (q
0
; q
1
) are invariant to the choice of this
new assignment mechanism. Depending on the specic informational assumptions it is
thinkable that, for example, the initial conditions Y (0) are aected by the assignment
mechanism.
In general, we can always x a class of assignment mechanisms within which potential
outcomes are invariant and contrast potential outcomes within this class. The actual
assignment mechanism should be in the class. Under perfect foresight we can allow the
assignment mechanism to vary arbitrarily. If we have suÆciently rich data, we can index
potential outcomes by the (parameters of the) assignment mechanism and contrast out-
comes between assignment mechanisms and assigned plans. This requires a specication
of a \meta-mechanism" for the selection of assignment mechanisms.
3.5 Optimal policy estimation
In an interesting recent development, Murphy (2002) has developed methods to choose
an optimal treatment plan based on an empirical analysis of Robins' dynamic potential-
outcome model (see also Robins, 2002). This is of direct interest to economic policy
makers, provided that they accept Robins' framework as such.
15
The key problem in di-
rectly applying Murphy's methods to dynamic economic decision problems lies, of course,
in the latter premise.
Our discussion implies that consistency Assumptions 4 and 5 are likely to fail in
economic applications. These assumptions require that dierent dynamic policies yield
the same outcome at some point in time if they happen to deliver the same treatments
up to that time. This excludes anticipatory eects. Furthermore, policies that randomize
treatments| we have not considered these so far (see e.g. Gill and Robins, 2001)|
should yield the same outcomes as non-random static policies if they happen to realize
the same treatment paths. Thus, the choice of the optimal dynamic policy is bound
to ignore the potential expectations eects of dierent dynamic assignment rules. The
dynamics of the plans only serve to dynamically allocate the treatments to those who
benet most. In doing so, the planner is forced to presume that outcomes are invariant
across dierent policies that assign the same treatment paths. In this sense, the analysis
is essentially static and not very dierent from a similar analysis with the static model
15
From the perspective of this paper, it is interesting to note that such dynamic programming problems
certainly had the interest of H. Theil (e.g. Theil, 1957).
22
of stratied randomized experiments at the end of Subsection 2.2. This seems perfectly
reasonable in the medical applications for which these methods are developed. In an
economic environment, however, we should expect that agents are aware of the actual
assignment rule and respond to that.
3.6 Selection on unobservables
In econometric program evaluation, randomization assumptions like Assumption 6 are not
very likely to be satised. Observational economic data suer from a lot of heterogeneity
between agents (e.g. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). Some of this heterogeneity is
bound to be unmeasured. In a dynamic context, such unmeasured heterogeneity leads to
violations of randomization assumptions. This is true even if the unmeasured variables
only aect the availability of slots in programs but not outcomes directly. If agents are ra-
tional, forward-looking and, unlike the econometrician, observe the unmeasured variables,
they will typically respond to these variables because these aect future opportunities
to participate in programs (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003 and 2004). Thus, there
may be indirect eects on outcomes even if there are no direct eects. In any case, the
randomization condition fails.
For the same reason, identication based on instrumental variables is relatively hard in
dynamic models. If the candidate instruments only vary cross-sectionally, the argument
above implies that they are not likely to be valid instruments. Rather than instrumental
variables, we need instrumental processes (Robins, 1997) that yield some random variation
in treatment assignment at each point in time. In the context of continuously assigned
treatments, the implied data requirements seem onerous (Abbring and Van den Berg,
2003).
Possibly the most fruitful econometric approach to selection on unobservables is the
construction of explicit models of dynamic selection and outcomes. Carneiro, Heckman
and Hansen (2003) have recently developed such a model based on a dynamic factor
structure. Similar ideas underly the event-history approach to program evaluation, which
we will discuss next.
4 The event-history approach to policy evaluation
4.1 Introduction
Researchers facing the problem of analyzing the eect of dynamic programs on dynamic
outcomes have often resorted to event-history methods. Examples in economics include
Ridder (1986), Card and Sullivan (1988), Gritz (1993), Lillard (1993), Ham and Lalonde
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(1996), Lillard and Panis (1996), Eberwein, Ham and Lalonde (1997), Bonnal, Fougere
and Serandon (1997), Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997), and Van den Berg,
Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004). In elds like epidemiology, the use of event-history
models to analyze treatment eects is widespread (see e.g. Andersen et al., 1993, and
Keiding, 1999).
The event-history approach to program evaluation is rmly rooted in the econometric
literature on state-dependence and heterogeneity (Heckman and Borjas, 1980, and Heck-
man, 1981). Event-history models along the lines of Heckman and Singer (1984) are used
to jointly model transitions into programs and transitions into outcome states. Causal
eects of programs are modelled as the dependence of individual transition rates on the
individual history of program participation. Dynamic selection eects are modelled by
allowing for dependent unobserved heterogeneity in both the program and outcome tran-
sition rates. A typical, simple example is a mixed semi-Markov model in which the causal
eects are restricted to program participation in the previous spell (e.g. Bonnal, Fougere
and Serandon, 1997).
The mainstream treatment-eects literature has recently stressed semi-parametric and
non-parametric methods of inference. Applied papers employing the event-history ap-
proach, on the other hand, usually estimate highly parameterized models. There is a
substantial literature on the identiability of state-dependence eects and heterogene-
ity in duration and event-history models (see Heckman and Taber, 1994, and Van den
Berg, 2001, for reviews). This literature can be exploited and extended to reconcile both
approaches.
16
Here, we provide discussion for some canonical cases.
In Subsection 4.2, we discuss the simplest case of mutual dependence of events in
continuous time, involving only two binary events. This case is suÆciently rich to capture
the eect of a dynamically assigned binary treatment on a duration outcome. Binary
events in continuous time can be fully characterized by the time at which they occur
and a structural model for their joint determination is a simultaneous-equations model
for durations. We will develop such a model along the lines of Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003). Rephrasing their model explicitly as a simultaneous-equations model does
not only provide a link with Theil's work, but also highlights the fundamental problems
that arise if we try to infer the causal eects of a dynamically assigned treatment on
a duration outcome using techniques developed for static models. In Subsection 4.3, we
conclude with a short discussion of the event-history approach to program evaluation from
a more general (multiple-treatment, multiple-outcome) perspective.
16
Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) discuss the relation between the event-history approach to program
evaluation and more standard latent-variable and panel-data methods, with a focus on identication
issues.
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4.2 A simultaneous-equations model for durations
Consider two random durations Y and D that assume values in R
+
:= R
+
[ f1g, where
R
+
:= [0;1). We refer to one of the durations, D, as the treatment (time) and to the other
duration, Y , as the outcome. Such an asymmetry arises naturally in many applications.
For example, in Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997)'s study of unemployment
insurance, the treatment is a punitive benets reduction (sanction) and the outcome re-
employment. The re-employment process continues after imposition of a sanction, but
the sanctions process is terminated by re-employment. The current exposition, however,
is symmetric and unies both cases. The point 1 represents the event that the outcome
or treatment never occur.
Dene collections of nonnegative potential treatments fD
y
; y 2 R
+
g and potential out-
comes fY
s
; s 2 R
+
g. Here, D
y
is the random treatment that would prevail if the outcome is
externally set to y. Similarly, Y
d
is the outcome resulting from setting the treatment time
to d. Suppose that fD
y
; y 2 R
+
g and fY
d
; d 2 R
+
g are measurable processes. Assume
that D
y
and Y
d
are continuously distributed and denote the corresponding integrated
hazard rates by 
D
y
: R
+
7! R
+
and 
Y
s
: R
+
7! R
+
, respectively. These integrated
hazards fully determine the marginal distributions of D
y
and Y
d
. For example, by the
well known exponential formula for the survival function, Pr(D
y
> t) = exp( 
D
y
(t)).
For expositional convenience, we assume that both 
D
y
and 
Y
s
are strictly increasing on
R
+
. We also assume that the duration distributions are non-defective by requiring that

D
y
(1) = 
Y
s
(1) =1.
17
Dierences in the integrated hazards between potential outcomes or between poten-
tial treatments can be given a causal interpretation. To see this, note that, under the
assumptions above, 
D
y
(D
y
) and 
Y
d
(Y
d
) are unit exponential for all y; d 2 R
+
. So, we
can write
D
y
= 
 1
D
y
(E
D
y
) and Y
d
= 
 1
Y
d
(E
Y
d
);
with E
D
y
and E
Y
d
appropriate unit exponential random variables for all y; d 2 R
+
. The
distributions of E
D
y
and E
Y
d
are invariant to interventions. Thus, the integrated hazards
link the potential treatments and outcomes to errors that are invariant in distribution to
the interventions. Therefore, they have causal interpretations (see Freedman, 2002).
The model is again closed by requiring consistency of actual and potential outcomes
and treatments,
Assumption 7. Consistency. Y
D
= Y and D
Y
= D.
17
Abbring and Van den Berg do allow for defects, which often have structural interpretations. See
Abbring (2002) for some discussion and results.
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We should be careful here, as our model may not be coherent: it may not have a solution
(Y;D).
18
If it does, it is unique by consistency. Consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 8. No anticipation. For all t 2 R
+
,

Y
t
= 
Y
1
and 
D
t
= 
D
1
on [0; t]:
Assumption 9. Strong invariance. For all t 2 R
+
, E
Y
t
= E
Y
and E
D
t
= E
D
for some
unit-exponential random variables E
Y
and E
D
.
Assumption 8 implies that the hazard rates for any two potential outcomes Y
d
and Y
d
0
coincide almost everywhere until the smallest of the hypothetical treatments times d and
d
0
. We say that there are no eects of anticipation of the treatment on the outcome.
Similarly, Assumption 8 excludes anticipation eects of future outcomes on the treatment
hazard. Together, Assumptions 8{9 ensure
Lemma 1 (Coherency). Under Assumptions 7{9, there is a unique (Y;D) such that
Y = Y
D
and D = D
Y
.
Proof. Draw (E
Y
; E
D
) and compute (Y
1
; D
1
). If Y
1
 D
1
, then Y = Y
1
and D =
D
Y
 Y . Otherwise, Y
1
> D
1
, D = D
1
and Y = Y
D
> D.
To gain some more insight in the role of Assumption 9, we need some additional
notation. Let N
Y
d
(t) := I
[0;t]
(Y
d
) be a binary random variable that indicates whether the
outcome event would have occurred at time t or before if a treatment was assigned at time
d. Then, fN
Y
d
g is a process that counts the number of such potential-outcome events|
at most one| up to and including each point in time. Similarly, dene fN
D
y
g, fN
Y
g
and fN
D
g. Assumption 9 essentially ensures that a strong version of Assumption 7, like
Assumption 5 in the discrete-time model, holds:
Lemma 2 (Strong no-anticipation). Assumptions 8 and 9 imply that for all t 2 R
+
,
N
Y
t
() = N
Y
1
() and N
D
t
() = N
D
1
() for all  2 [0; t].
Under Assumptions 7{9, our model is a fully recursive dynamic structural model (possibly
with dependent errors) for the processes fN
Y
; N
D
g even though it is not recursive in terms
of Y and D. Therefore, coherency problems do not arise.
We illustrate these ideas with two examples. We need
Assumption 10. Randomization. fD
y
; y 2 R
+
g??fY
s
; s 2 R
+
g.
18
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) do not explicitly model the (lack of) causal determination of D
by Y . Therefore, their structural model of Y and D is triangular and they do not have to worry about
coherency.
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Example 4. Consider a standard partial search model describing the job search behavior
of an unemployed individual (e.g. Mortensen, 1986). Job oers arrive at a rate  > 0 and
are random draws from a given distribution F . An oer is either accepted or rejected.
A rejected oer cannot be recalled at a later time. The individual initially receives a
constant ow of unemployment-insurance benets. However, the individual faces the risk
of a sanction| a permanent reduction of his benets to some lower, constant level| at
some point during his unemployment spell. During the unemployment spell, sanction
arrive independently of the job-oer process at a constant rate  > 0. The individual
cannot foresee the exact time a sanction is imposed, but he does know the distribution of
these times.
19
The individual chooses a job-acceptance rule as to maximize his expected
discounted lifetime income. Under standard conditions this is a reservation-wage rule:
at time t, the individual accepts each wage of w(t) or higher. The corresponding re-
employment hazard rate is (1 F (w(t)). Apart from the sanction, which is not foreseen
and arrives at a constant rate during the unemployment spell, the model is stationary.
This implies that the reservation wage is constant, say equal to w
0
, up to and including
time d, jumps to some lower level w
1
< w
0
at time d and stays constant at w
1
for the
remainder of the unemployment spell if benets would be reduced at time d.
The model ts our simultaneous-equations model for durations in the following way.
Let Y be the re-employment duration and D the sanction time. The potential-outcome
hazards are

Y
d
(t) =
(

0
if 0  t  d

1
if t > d
and the corresponding integrated hazards are

Y
d
(t) =
(

0
t if 0  t  d

0
d+ 
1
(t  d) if t > d;
where 
0
:=  [1  F (w
0
)] and 
1
:=  [1  F (w
1
)]. Similarly, the potential-treatment
hazards are

D
y
(t) =
(
 if 0  t  y
0 if t > y
and the corresponding integrated hazards are 
D
y
(t) = minft; yg. For deniteness, we
have set the sanction hazard to 0 after re-employment.
19
This is a rudimentary version of the partial search model with punitive benets reductions, or sanc-
tions, of Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997). The main dierence is that in the present version
of the model the sanctions process cannot be controlled by the agent.
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Note that Assumption 7 follows naturally from the recursive structure of the economic
decision problem in this case in which we have properly accounted for all relevant events.
The model furthermore species that fE
Y
d
g??fE
D
y
g (Assumption 10), but is agnostic
about Assumption 9. Assumption 9 would imply a deterministic relation between the
potential re-employment times. If we hypothetically move the sanction back in time from
d to d
0
< d, then the potential outcome would change from
Y
d
= min

E
Y

0
; d

+

0

1

E
Y

0
 min

E
Y

0
; d

to
Y
d
0
=
8
>
<
>
:
Y
d
if Y
d
 d
0
;
d
0
+

0

1
(Y
d
  d
0
) if d
0
< Y
d
 d; and
Y
d
 

1
 
0

1
(d  d
0
) if Y
d
> d:
Clearly, strong no-anticipation (as in Lemma 2) holds.
Example 5. We can add some perspective to an early example of a structural bivariate
duration model, the bivariate exponential model of Freund (1961), by restating it as a
special case of our simultaneous-equations model for durations. Freund considers the
survival of the components in a two-component system that can operate even if one of the
components has failed. One example is a plane with two engines. Failure of one engine
increases the stress on and therefore presumably the failure rate of the remaining engine.
Freund constructs a model for the failure times Y andD of the system's two components|
the asymmetric notation is less appropriate here| as follows. First, he considers the dis-
tribution of the failure time of either component in the hypothetical case in which failing
components are immediately replaced by new components. This intervention corresponds
to our \no-treatment" case 1 and the corresponding failure times are Y
1
and D
1
. Fre-
und assumes that Y
1
and D
1
are independently and exponentially distributed, say with
hazard rates  and .
Next, Freund considers the case of interest in which failed components are not replaced.
He assumes that the failure of the second component causes a change in the failure rate of
the rst component from  to a possibly dierent, constant level 
0
. Similarly, the failure
rate of the second component changes from  to 
0
when the rst component fails. Freund
assumes that Y and D are only dependent through these causal eects, which is what we
have called randomization (Assumption 10). Clearly, this model satises no-anticipation
(Assumption 8). We can impose Assumption 9, without necessarily accepting its strong
causal implications, to ensure coherency and to facilitate an explicit construction of all
potential failure times.
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If we have data on (Y;D) and under Assumptions 7{10, we can identify 
Y
d
and 
D
y
(up
to almost-sure equivalence) from standard hazard regressions (e.g. Andersen et al., 1993;
Fleming and Harrington, 1991). Moreover, the proof of Proposition 1 in Abbring and Van
den Berg (2003) can be directly extended to prove
Proposition 3 (Non-identiability). Let F be any distribution on R
2
+
with strictly
positive Lebesgue density. Then, there exists some (fY
d
g; fD
y
g) that satises Assumptions
7{10 and such that (Y;D) = (Y
D
; D
Y
) has distribution F .
Proposition 3 shows that no-anticipation (Assumption 8) and randomization (Assumption
10) can be imposed without restricting the data. In the words that Gill and Robins (2001),
used in the context of the closely-related Proposition 2, these assumptions are \free".
Abbring and Van den Berg point out that, from a substantial perspective, Proposition 3
implies that we cannot (i) disentangle selection eects and causal eects and (ii) identify
anticipation eects without imposing further structure on the model.
Economists are typically not willing nor interested to make the type of strong causal
statements that require Assumption 9. Interest usually focuses on weaker statements
based on the invariance of the distribution of shocks only. Proposition 3 however im-
plies that Assumption 9 has no empirical implications. We can therefore impose it as a
modelling tool, just to ensure coherency.
It is instructive to express the model as a simultaneous-equations model in terms of
Y and D. Note that we can write
Y = u(E
Y
; D)
D = v(E
D
; Y );
(4)
where u(e; d) := 
 1
Y
d
(e) and v(e; y) := 
 1
D
y
(e) for e; d; y 2 R
+
. The initial, dynamic
setup of the model was inspired by substantial economic considerations that we would
like to address in an empirical analysis. Its simultaneous-equations representation in (4)
better reects the data actually available for this analysis: at the very best an uncensored
sample from the distribution of (Y;D). Clearly, (4) is not identied (and may not even
be coherent) even if we assume that E
Y
??E
D
(Assumption 10). We have seen though
that it is identied if, in addition, we impose Assumption 8, an assumption inspired by
substantial considerations.
We are willing to take the no-anticipation Assumption 8 as fundamental. In practice,
this requires that we measure all relevant informational events. We would however like
to relax the randomization Assumption 10. Equation (4) suggests that we nd instru-
ments Z??(E
Y
; E
D
) that appear in one equation and not in the other, and apply some
instrumental-variables method to identify and estimate the model. However, as argued
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in Subsection 3.6, such static instruments are not likely to be valid in the present inher-
ently dynamic setting with forward-looking agents. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003),
who explicitly recognize this problem, analyze identication in a model framework with
additional structure, but without exclusion restrictions.
4.3 More general event-history models
The results of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) are in the vein of the approach to program
evaluation in which dynamic selection into programs and outcomes are jointly modelled
by event-history models. Causal eects of programs are modelled as genuine state de-
pendence. Dynamic selection eects are modelled by allowing for dependent unobserved
heterogeneity in both the program and outcome transition rates. Obviously, if we do not a
priori restrict the class of models that we consider, we can always formulate a model that
attributes all observed dependence of treatment and outcome events over time to state
dependence and that leaves no role for dynamic selection. This, in a nutshell, is the fun-
damental problem of distinguishing state-dependence and heterogeneity (Heckman, 1981,
and Heckman and Borjas, 1980).
In applied work, researchers avoid this problem by imposing additional structure.
Econometric research over the last 25 years has produced a variety of identication results
for duration and event-history models (see Heckman and Taber, 1994, and Van den Berg,
2001, for reviews). Unfortunately, fairly little is known for some of the most popular
models for the empirical analysis of dynamically assigned programs. A typical example
is the mixed semi-Markov model, in which the causal eects are restricted to program
participation in the previous spell (e.g. Bonnal, Fougere and Serandon, 1997). Abbring
(2000) provides some rst results for this framework.
Of course, the importance of taking the information structure of programs into account
and concerns about the validity of instruments carry over to the general event-history
approach.
Example 6. An nice illustration of this point is oered by Eberwein, Ham and Lalonde
(1997), who study the eects of a training program on labor-market transitions. Their data
are particularly nice, as potential participants are randomized into treatment and control
groups at some baseline point in time. Compliance to this intention-to-treat is however
imperfect: some agents in the control group are able to enroll in substitute programs, and
some agents in the treatment group never enroll in a program. Those in the treatment
group are more likely to enroll though, which, together with randomization, suggests that
the intention-to-treat indicator can be used as an instrument for actual participation in a
training program.
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An important aspect of the data is that actual enrollment is dispersed over time. One
could maintain two hypotheses. First, agents could be informed about the actual time a
training slot will become available. Then, they will presumably anticipate future partic-
ipation in the program and change their behavior from the baseline time onwards (as in
Example 5). Eberwein et al., however, specify a model that excludes such anticipatory
eects. Thus, they seem to opt for the second hypothesis, which is that agents cannot
perfectly foresee the time at which training slots will be oered. In that case, agents will
presumably respond to their intention-to-treat status even before they actually enroll in
a training program. Then, intention-to-treat is not a valid instrument. Specic addi-
tional assumptions are needed to ensure that the intention-to-treat indicator is a valid
instrument.
In any case, a direct analysis of the eect of the intention-to-treat indicator on labor
market transitions is valid under very general conditions. Eberwein et al. provide such an
analysis, which is directly informative on the eect of oering a larger choice set of training
programs to the population under study. As in the static Neyman-Rubin framework with
instruments (Subsection 2.3), a reduced-form analysis of the eect of the instrument on
outcomes may be the more interesting one if policy makers only control the program
choice set, but not actual participation.
5 Conclusion
It is clear that the analysis of dynamically assigned programs on dynamic outcomes using
statistically robust methods is still in its infancy. The extensive set of tools developed for
this problem in statistics does not apply directly to evaluation of programs in economies
with forward-looking agents. Recent progress in econometrics focuses on phrasing and
robustly analyzing appropriate dynamic econometric selection models.
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